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Abstract
This paper is analyzes one-way access and, in particular, local loop unbundling (LLU) in
telecommunications markets. At present, LLU seems most promising as a means for entrants
to offer broadband internet access. As voice telephony can be implemented by using the
‘internet protocol’ when consumers have broadband access, LLU may, in the end, spur com-
petition in markets for voice telephony as well. Thus LLU is an important way to stimulate
competition in the broadly defined market for fixed telecommunications.
In this paper we explore situations of one-way access in which the entrant, the firm
without the essential input, has market power. We first review the nature of LLU when
there is full consumer participation. Next, we explore the case of partial participation, where
the entrant can attract further participation. In the first case, unbundling requirements
are neutral to competition. This result breaks down under partial consumer participation.
Hence, regulation of unbundling requirements should be particularly concerned with market
segments such as broadband access in which partial participation seems to be a key feature.
JEL-Classification: L96, L51, L13
Keywords: one-way access, essential facility, local-loop unbundling, regulation, telecommuni-
cations, fixed telephony, VoIP
1 Introduction
A major promise of the 1990s was the rollout of local access networks in telecommunica-
tions markets. Nevertheless, local network rollout has been somewhat disappointing, and
at present, competition in the ‘local loop’ is hardly mature. Network rollout has been nar-
rowly targeted; while some operators found it worthwhile to connect business districts and
metropolitan areas, residential customers have hardly been exposed to entrants with their
own networks. Therefore the traditional providers of fixed voice telephony (the former incum-
bents) still have strong positions in the market for local access. Consumers did, however, to
some extent benefit from entry made possible by ‘carrier select’ and ‘local loop unbundling’
(LLU). At present, LLU seems most promising as a means for entrants to offer broadband
internet access by using ‘digital subscriber line’ (DSL) technology. Nevertheless, as voice
telephony can alternatively be implemented by using the ‘internet protocol’ when consumers
have broadband access, LLU may, in the end, also spur competition in markets for voice
telephony. Thus LLU is, potentially, still an important way to stimulate competition in the
(broadly defined) market for telecommunications.
In telecoms, unbundling usually implies wholesale leasing of the local loop. In other
markets, unbundling can be interpreted more broadly. More generally, unbundling can be
seen as a method of implementing ‘one-way’ access to an incumbent’s network. Unbundling
typically implies that the incumbent’s essential input (and perhaps others as well) is, at
the wholesale level, ‘separated’ from its overall facilities or operations, in order to allow for
commercial wholesale supply of this input. Hence, although it is typically discussed within
the framework of telecommunications, it has wider relevance. In postal markets, for instance,
through unbundling regulators may enforce access to the incumbent’s system for local mail
delivery (access to ‘the postman’). Unbundling of the postal value chain, a notion known
as worksharing, allows competitors to buy the incumbent’s delivery function, and perhaps
others as well, such as the sorting of mail items. In electricity, regulators may mandate access
to electricity companies’ local distribution networks. In financial securities trading, the book
depository function (the legal records of ownership changes) may be unbundled from the
broad set of clearing and settlement services.1
In this paper we explore situations of one-way access in which an entrant, that is the
firm without the essential input, has some market power. Accordingly, there is imperfect
1 In the latter example, unbundling may serve to create a central register, rather than to introduce compe-
tition.
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competition between an integrated firm, the incumbent, and a non-integrated firm. We
strongly believe that such a situation often better represents the real world than situations
in which there is a competitive fringe that needs to purchase the essential input from the
incumbent. Indeed, the appearance of entrants on the market immediately tends to generate
some discipline on incumbents, and it is crucial to understand the interactions that take place
when entrants have some market power, no matter how little in the beginning.
We first explore the nature of LLU when there is full consumer participation. Full con-
sumer participation here means that total demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to price
changes. Second, we explore the case of partial participation by consumers. Here, we ex-
plore the specific case that an entrant generates additional demand and that this additional
demand depends on price. To analyze these situations we present simple models of compet-
ing telecommunications networks. In the baseline model with full participation unbundling
requirements are neutral to competition: they do neither affect the entrant’s profit nor its
market share; this is a generalization of earlier results, see for instance De Bijl and Peitz
(2002). In this context we discuss investment incentives of the integrated network. Fur-
thermore, we extend the analysis to partial consumer participation. In particular, we show
that the neutrality result breaks down under partial consumer participation. This implies
that regulation of unbundling requirements should be particularly concerned with market
segments such as broadband access in which partial participation seems to be a key feature
of the consumer side. Based on the analysis, we draw policy-relevant conclusions that are
timely given the rather slow progress of LLU-based entry so far. We give specific attention
to the possibility of ‘voice over internet protocol’ (VoIP) as a new technology to stimulate
competition. In particular, entrants that lease local loops in order to offer broadband Internet
access, widen the possibilities for voice telephony over the Internet.
It should be noted that although our model is placed within the context of telecommuni-
cations, our results are more general and have applicability to other sectors as well. In fact
they have relevance to all markets where unbundling and one-way access are potential means
to facilitate competition.
We fear that policy discussions tend to ignore the relationship between regulation of the
wholesale price of an essential input and the nature of competition in the retail market.2
Previous work on one-way access has focussed on the optimal second-best pricing (Ramsey
pricing) in the context of one-way access for homogeneous services or differentiated services
2Gual and Seabright (2000), a paper prepared for DGCOMP, European Commission, provides an overview
of the economics of LLU, and the main regulatory challenges.
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with a competitive fringe. The literature has also considered access price rules for given
retail prices, in particular the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) has received a lot of
attention. Both these strands are thoroughly analyzed and discussed in Armstrong (2002);
see also Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Vogelsang (2003). We do not know of any work with
price-setting imperfectly competitive networks except Laffont and Tirole (1994), who only
analyze the Ramsey prices in such a situation.
Typically, this literature is a short-term analysis which ignores investment incentives (it
should be acknowledged that the issue of inefficient entry has been discussed). Valletti (2003)
provides a useful discussion of investment incentives. However, the theoretical literature is
rather silent on the issue.3
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
unbundling in practice. Section 3 revisits LLU in the case of full participation by end-users.
Section 4 explores a straightforward case of partial participation. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Policy on Local-Loop Unbundling in Telecoms
To provide some institutional background, this section provides an overview of regulation
and policy towards unbundling of the local loop in telecommunications markets. We focus
on the situation in the European Union and in the US.4
2.1 Unbundling in the EU
Already before the introduction of the new regulatory framework, European regulation man-
dated the provision of unbundled access to the local loop.5 ,6 The general philosophy is that
mandatory access is an effective means to deal with persistent network monopolies, but as
it reduces entrants’ incentives to innovate and invest in networks themselves, it should be
3One exception is Bourreau and Dogan (2005) who highlight the importance of access charges for LLU on
the entrant’s incentives to invest in its own facilities. They focus on the case where access charges are not
regulated. See also the discussion in De Bijl and Peitz (2002).
4For a more elaborate overview of the European situation, see Doyle (2000). For a recent discussion on the
US, see e.g. Speta (2004).
5European Parliament and Council (2000). See also Delgado et al. (2004, p. 170).
6The EC defines the local loop as the “physical twisted metallic pair connecting the network termination
point at the subscriber’s premises to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility in the fixed public
telephone network” (European Parliament and Council, 2000, p. 4).
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gradually withdrawn as competition becomes sufficiently mature. According to the EC,7
“The high cost of duplicating the local access infrastructure is ruling out new
market entrants. This is affecting the level of competition, which the Regulation is
intended to increase by offering unbundled access to the local loop, i.e. by enabling
new competitors to offer high bit-rate data transmission services for continuous
Internet access and for multimedia applications based on digital subscriber line
technology as well as voice telephony services.”
For example, in 2003 there were 307 agreements on fully unbundled lines throughout 15
countries in Europe, even though they were probably mostly aiming at broadband internet
access instead of voice. However, since broadband internet access allows for voice telephony
by using ‘voice over internet protocol’ (VoIP) and ‘voice over digital subscriber line’ (VoDSL),
these unbundling agreements may become (or already are) also relevant for voice telephony.
The EU average monthly rental was € 11.5 and the average connection charge was € 68.2
in 2003 (see European Commission, 2003, p.48, 60). Mandated unbundling applied only
to operators that had been designated by their NRAs (national regulatory authorities) as
having significant market power (SMP). Moreover, according to European legislation, access
prices (the line rentals of the local loop) must be transparent, non-discriminatory, fair, and
proportionate to costs.
Similarly under the new framework, unbundled access of the local loop has become a
regulatory remedy to deal with dominance (see e.g. Buigues, 2004). If the NRA establishes
SMP, it must apply appropriate remedies. This has to be done on the basis of a list of
obligations formulated in the Access Directive,8 related to transparency, non-discrimination,
accounting separation, access (unbundled access and resale of facilities), price control and cost
accounting. Note that the NRA is not obliged to impose obligations on operators with SMP.
However, access regulation is typically appropriate (and hence obligatory), especially in the
early stages of competition, when entrants have not yet rolled out alternative infrastructures
(see e.g. the results obtained by De Bijl and Peitz, 2002).
Local loop unbundling implied a major promise for opening telecommunications markets
throughout Europe, but its success has been meager so far, which is somewhat surprising
(see e.g. Delgado et al., 2004). Given that facilities-based entry has been narrowly targeted
7Summary of legislation on unbundled access to the local loop (Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000),
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24108j.htm, consulted 22-9-2004.
8European Parliament and Council (2002).
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(especially at business parks and metropolitan areas), unbundled access provides, in principle,
an attractive way of capturing market share beyond the reach of an operator’s connections to
end-users. This is especially true as unbundled access gives entrants full control of the local
loop, allowing them to configure their own services. Nevertheless, Carrier Select-based entry
has been observed much more frequently, at least in markets for voice telephony.9
2.2 Unbundling in the US
The major event that shaped the industry in the US in the last decade was the introduction of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It intended to promote competition, reduce regulation
and stimulate the development of new technologies. In particular, the desire was to open up
the market for local telecommunications, the ‘last bastion of monopoly’. Nevertheless, the
Act lead to a mixed experience, to put it mildly (see e.g. Economides, 1999).
The main instruments of introducing local competition were, first, the elimination of entry
barriers (e.g. legal impediments to provide telecoms services), and second, the requirement
that the incumbents — the ‘Baby Bells’ that resulted from the forced breakup of AT&T in 1984
— unbundle their local networks and lease local lines to entrants. The underlying idea of the
latter was that economically efficient duplication of the local access network was not feasible
for entrants. As a pre-condition for entry by the incumbents in the market for long-distance
telephony, the Act required that competition be present in local telephony.
Implementing LLU has been a tough process, and it is still uncertain when the desired
end-state will be reached. For instance, incumbents and entrants are required to individually
negotiate interconnection agreements, subject to a public arbitration procedure in case of
breakdown of the negotiations. Not only does this two-step approach easily lead to delays,
unbundling requests also lead to contested proceedings before courts. At present, the imple-
mentation rules formulated by the FCC, for instance related to the question which parts of
a network must be shared with entrants and related to the lease price, remain unsettled to a
large extent (see Speta, 2004, Part III, C).
Although the Act has, so far, not been very successful and led to many legal battles,
it should be noted that, similar to the situation in the EU, some local markets do exhibit
competition. Substantial competition has developed in market segments for big corporate
9See e.g. European Commission (2003). This report, while providing statistics about facilities used by
entrants to offer voice telephony (particularly to residential users), only presents information about Carrier
Select and Preselect, not unbundled local loops. When providing information about unbundled local loops, it
applies to broadband internet access.
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customers and (densely populated) metropolitan areas. Also, incumbents and cable compa-
nies compete in the market for broadband Internet access (see the discussion and references
in Speta, 2004, Part IV). Here, the incumbents telephone networks offer DSL technology. It
should be noted, however, that the unbundling requirements of the 1996 Act did not primar-
ily aim at the latter market segments. In contrast to those market segments, the situation
in suburban and rural market segments remains quite uncertain. Moreover, although the
Act’s unbundling regime also apply to DSL services, the provision of broadband Internet
access by entrants leasing local loops has not yet been impressive — the main competition for
incumbents comes from cable companies (see Speta, 2004, Part IV, A).
To conclude this section, we note that both the rationale for unbundling as well as the
disappointing experience are shared throughout the EU and in the US (although the causes
may be different). It is rather difficult to assess why LLU has shown few positive results
for market structure and competition in voice telephony. A possible reason is simply that
lease prices are too high to encourage entrants to offer voice through LLU.10 The relatively
successful move towards competition in the market for broadband internet access can be
explained by the attractiveness of market share in this market relative to the one for voice
telephony. However, as a starting point for further analyses it seems to us critical to gain a
better understanding of the effects of access prices on competition and the resulting market
outcomes. This is what the present paper attempts to do.
3 Regulatory Theory with Full Participation
We consider a market of two networks, one vertically integrated network (denoted as firm 1)
which owns local-loop plus additional facilities (in particular a backbone and switches) and
one non-integrated network (denoted as firm 2) which owns only a backbone and switches,
and needs access to the other firm’s local loop. More generally, two firms compete with each
other, while one them owns an essential facility which provides a necessary input for the
production process. The price at which the integrated network sells access to the essential
facility is fixed by a regulator. We call it the lease price, or line rental, and denote it by l.
10Related to the situation in the EU, Kallen and Woehrl (2003) cite officials of DG Competition of the
European Commission who explain the negative result for voice telephony by invoking incumbents’ pricing
policies and NRAs’ ineffective responses to price squeezes. It should be noted, though, that Kallen and Woehrl
do not subscribe to this view.
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Network 1’s per-user cost is denoted by f1. A local connection to an end-user comprises
two components, namely a ‘local line’ and a ‘line card’, with associated costs per user fLL1




1 . When firm 2 requests unbundled
access to network 1, it installs its own linecard, with a cost per user fLC2 = f
LC
1 , and uses
firm 1’s local line. Accordingly, firm 2’s perceived per-user cost equals f2 = l + fLC1 .
There is a continuum of consumers with mass 1. Each consumer subscribes to one network,
or alternatively, purchases one unit from the operator he or she selects. Consumers have an
inelastic demand for a single subscription, while their willingness to pay is assumed to be
sufficiently high so that they will always make a purchase.
The local network owner (firm 1) derives revenues from subscriptions and from line rental.
Since the lease price of the local loop is regulated, the only strategic variable of the local
network owner is the price that consumers have to pay for the services if they subscribe. We
denote that price by p1. Also, the entrant charges a price p2 to consumers that demand its
services. An example for prices pi are flat rates for internet access. Market shares si(p1, p2)
depend on the prices charged by both operators. It is then natural to assume that market
share is decreasing in its own price and increasing in the price of the competitor. Furthermore,
we assume that market shares only depend on the price difference p2−p1. This assumption is
satisfied for quasi-linear preferences when consumers have identical demand functions. With
full participation, total market demand is fixed. For an example see below. Figure 1 illustrates
the set-up of the model.
Profit functions are as follows. Firm 1’s profits can be written as
π1(p1, p2; l) = s1(p1, p2)(p1 − f1) + (1− s1(p1, p2))(l − fLL1 ),
and firm 2’s profits as
π2(p1, p2; l) = s2(p1, p2)(p2 − l − fLC2 ).
The property that market share changes continuously with price implies that firms have
market power. Consumers do not consider the services provided by the two firms as perfect
substitute and therefore do not necessarily go for the lower priced service. A situation with
imperfect substitutes seems to be common in telecommunications and other markets. For
instance, brand recognition and switching costs lead to imperfect substitutes. Also, the
services by firms are often bundles of different offers and features. If firms offer different
bundles, they are considered as imperfect substitutes.
A special case of our general model is obtained by assuming that the networks are hor-
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Figure 1: the one-way access model
the interval [0, 1]. Firm 1 is located at location y1 = 0 on the interval, and firm 2 at y2 = 1.
A consumer located at z buying from firm i incurs a disutility −θ|yi− z|. Note that a higher
value of parameter θ corresponds to more differentiation between the networks. A consumer
at z buys from firm 1 if v1(p1, p2) − θz > v2(p1, p2) − θ(1 − z), where vi(p1, p2) denotes the
conditional indirect utility of a network at the ideal location z. Market shares then sat-
isfy si(p1, p2) = 12 + (vi(p1, p2) − vj(p1, p2))/(2θ), where j 6= i. This is the simple Hotelling
specification which has also been used in models on two-way access (see e.g. Armstrong,
2002).
In a more elaborate model, one could incorporate that consumers have a demand to make
calls, or to have access to the Internet, in addition to the demand for a subscription. Such
extensions lead to additional interactions between the operators, for instance because there is
call traffic between the networks – see De Bijl and Peitz (2004) for an inclusion of call traffic.
Nevertheless, the present model captures the crucial strategic effects of one-way access.
Operators choose prices in order to maximize profits. Consumers make purchasing de-
cisions, based on utility maximization, after observing the prices. We are interested in an
equilibrium configuration (p∗1, p
∗
2) in which both firms do not have an incentive to change
their retail prices. That is, given the competitor’s retail price, each operator maximizes its
profits. Accordingly, given the equilibrium price of the competitor, the profit maximization
8











1, p2; l). (2)
Suppose that there exists a unique pair (p∗1, p
∗
2) which solves both problems simultaneously
(hence it constitutes an equilibrium). We are then interested in which way a change in
regulatory policy affects market outcomes. Suppose that under the new regulatory regime
the lease price is changed to l0 = l +∆l. We can then show that this increase in the lease
price is passed through to consumers. Equilibrium market shares are unaffected and the
non-integrated network’s profit are neutral to regulation. However, the integrated network
benefits two-fold: it charges higher retail prices and it receives a higher lease price for those
consumers who subscribe to the competitor’s network. Consumers suffer from the lease price
increase: they face higher prices by both networks.
Given the new lease price l0 = l +∆l, we claim that equilibrium retail prices are p∗∗1 =




2 +∆l. Our proof consists of establishing that p
∗∗
i is the solution of the
maximization problem of operator i, i = 1, 2.




2 )(p1 − f1) + (1− s1(p1, p∗∗2 ))(l +∆l − fLL1 )
Profit can be rewritten as
s1(p1, p
∗∗
2 )(p1 −∆l − f1) + (1− s1(p1, p∗∗2 ))(l − fLL1 ) +∆l
Provided that the competing operator sets p∗∗2 = p
∗
2+∆l, market shares satisfy s1(p1, p
∗∗
2 ) =
s1(p1−∆l, p∗2) because they only depend on price differences. Hence the vertically integrated
network’s profit can be rewritten as
s1(p1 −∆l, p∗2)(p1 −∆l − f1) + (1− s1(p1 −∆l, p∗2))(l − fLL1 ) +∆l
With a change of variable ep1 ≡ p1 −∆l, the maximization problem becomes
max
p1
s1(ep1, p∗2)(ep1 − f1) + (1− s1(ep1, p∗2))(l − fLL1 ) +∆l (3)
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Clearly, p∗1 is the solution to this problem because it is formally the same maximization
problem as problem (1) except for the constant ∆l. Since ep1 ≡ p1 −∆l we have shown that
p∗∗1 = p
∗









1 , p2)(p2 − l −∆l − fLC2 )
Provided that the competing operator sets p∗∗1 = p
∗
1+∆l, market shares satisfy s2(p
∗∗
1 , p2) =
s2(p
∗
1, p2 −∆l). Hence, using the change of variable ep2 = p2 −∆l the maximization problem





1, ep2)(ep2 − l − fLC2 ) (4)
Clearly, p∗2 is the solution to this problem because it is formally the same maximization




Hence, we have established the following result:
Result 1. With full participation, firm 2’s (the non-integrated network) profits are neutral to
the lease price of the local loop. An increase of the lease price by ∆l is passed on to consumers
one-to-one and firm 1 (the vertically integrated network) benefits from such a policy.
We believe it to be useful to elaborate on the above result. A lease price increase by
∆l works affects prices in the same way as a per-user cost increase (of the same magnitude
∆l) that is experienced by both networks; think of an increase of the line card’s per-user
cost fLCi for both firms. This can be seen as follows. The profits of operator 2 are equal to
s2(p1, p2)(p2 − l− (fLC2 +∆l)), that is, the profit function has the same form as with a lease
price l and costs fLC2 +∆l. The profit function of operator 1 becomes
π1(p1, p2; l +∆l) = s1(p1, p2)(p1 − f1) + (1− s1(p1, p2))(l +∆l − fLL1 ).







(l +∆l − fLL1 ) + s1(p1, p2) = 0,
which is equivalent to
∂s1(p1, p2)
∂p1
(p1 − (f1 +∆l))−
∂s1(p1, p2)
∂p1
(l − fLL1 ) + s1(p1, p2) = 0.
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This equation is also the first-order condition of profit maximization given lease price l and
costs for the linecard fLC1 +∆l, which leads to a total per-user cost of f1+∆l. Hence, a lease
price increase is passed on to consumers in exactly the same way as a cost increase. The
only difference is that the owner of the essential facility, that is, the integrated network, ben-
efits from a lease price increase because the associated ‘downstream’ cost increase generates
revenues ‘upstream’ at the essential facility.
In the present context an analysis of total surplus is straightforward. Provided that the
market is symmetric the socially desirable market share is 1/2. This is indeed implemented by
the equilibrium for any lease price (such that the participation constraint of consumers is not
violated and participation is indeed (perfectly) inelastic). However, if the market is not fully
symmetric strategic behavior between firms typically does not lead to an implementation of
a socially optimal outcome. In particular, if one network is more attractive than the other on
average, then the equilibrium market share of the less attractive network is socially excessive.
A detailed analysis of asymmetric situations is certainly of interest but here we do not explore
this issue any further.
To analyze investment incentives by the integrated network in the local loop we introduce
a quality parameter q. Alternatively, parameter q can be interpreted as a capacity level.
The former interpretation applies to both voice and Internet access, and the latter mainly to
internet access. For simplicity, we assume that an increase of this parameter shifts the profit
function by a factor d(q) outward for given lease price and gross of costs associated to this
improvement. The cost of implementing a quality or capacity improvement q > 1 is denoted
by C(q) with the convention C(1) = 0. Also by convention, d(1) = 1. We can then write the
integrated network’s profits as
d(q)π1(p1, p2, l)− C(q)
Clearly, if the lease price does not respond to the provided quality, then quality (or capacity)
is chosen such that it satisfies d0(q)π1(p∗1, p
∗
2; l) − C 0(q) = 0. If d is concave and C strictly
convex, there exists a unique solution to the profit maximization problem at the investment
stage at which firm 1 chooses q. Observe that a larger lease price leads to an increase in
π1, and hence strengthens the incentives of the integrated network to invest in the quality or
capacity of the local loop.
Regulatory policy should take into account that the quality of the local loop is affected by
its lease price regulation. To further strengthen the investment incentives without granting
large profit margins at the local loop regulators may make their lease price depend upon
11
quality. Suppose that the regulator can commit to a schedule l(q) with l0(q) > 0. Note that
equilibrium market shares are not affected by the level of the lease price (see Result 1 above).
The first-order condition of profit maximization at the investment stage can then be written
as
d0(q)π1(p1, p2; l)− C 0(q) + d(q)[s1(p∗1, p∗2)
dp∗1(l)
dl
+ (1− s1(p1, p2))]l0(q) = 0,
which reduces to
d0(q)π1(p1, p2; l)− C 0(q) + d(q)l0(q) = 0
since dp∗1(l)/dl = 1. We observe that with full participation, investment incentives are affected
by the shape of the lease price schedule but independent of the degree of competition in the
market. Furthermore, a more sensitive lease price schedule tends to increase investments
incentives. In other words, if the regulator wants to achieve a certain quality level without
giving large margins in the local loop he can do so by designing a sufficiently sensitive lease
price schedule. We summarize our discussion by the following result.
Result 2. With full participation, the regulator can provide stronger incentives to invest in
the quality or capacity of the local loop by increasing the sensitivity of the regulated lease price
to the quality or capacity level.
4 Regulatory Theory with Partial Participation
We extend our previous setup to include partial participation so that total demand depends
on prices. The perhaps easiest way to do so, is to assume that the services offered by the
non-integrated network leads to a market expansion. This can be motivated by seeing the
non-integrated network operator as a firm which can offer unique services (bundled into its
product) which are desired by a certain group of consumers. The integrated network owner
does not provide these tailored services and therefore cannot cater to the tastes of these
consumers.
Formally, we consider a market consisting of two segments. In the first segment, the
integrated and the non-integrated network are competitors. Segment 1 corresponds to the
market analyzed in the previous segment. In segment 2 only the non-integrated network is
active. The non-integrated network is assumed not to be able to price discriminate between
the two segments. Clearly, in such a setup we should expect the neutrality result that firm
2’s profits do not depend on the lease price, to break down. Furthermore, the integrated
network has now (at least locally) some incentive not to inflate the lease price, if it were able
12
to set it itself. The reason is that the higher the lease price, the higher the retail price set by
the non-integrated network, but this implies a reduction of demand for segment 2, which in
turn reduces firm 1’s access revenues.
Additional demand for the product offered by the non-integrated network is denoted
by a(p2), which is a decreasing function of operator 2’s retail price. This function reflects
the heterogeneous willingness-to-pay of consumers in the captive segment.11 Obviously, this
demand does not depend on the retail price of the integrated network, operator 1.
The profit maximization problem of the integrated network becomes
max
p1
s1(p1, p2)(p1 − f1) + (1− s1(p1, p2))(l − fLL1 ) + a(p2)(l − fLL1 ) (5)
Note that the third term in the sum is not affected by the decision of the integrated network.
Consequently, the first-order condition is the same as in the previous section. The profit
maximization problem of the non-integrated network is
max
p2
[s2(p1, p2) + a(p2)](p2 − l − fLC2 ) (6)
An equilibrium (p∗1, p
∗

























(p∗2 − l − fLC2 ) + [s2(p∗1, p∗2) + a(p∗2)] = 0. (7)
Suppose there is a unique solution to this system. Now consider a change in the lease price.
We first show that generically the profit neutrality result for the non-integrated network
breaks down.
Result 3. With partial participation, profit of the non-integrated network are generically not
neutral to the lease price of the local loop and the equilibrium demand of the integrated firm
s1 depends on the lease price l.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that after a change in the lease price of ∆l, equilib-
rium retail prices are p∗∗1 = p
∗




2 +∆l. Then, in equilibrium, the first-order











(p∗2 +∆l − (l +∆l)− fLC2 ) + [s2(p∗∗1 , p∗∗2 ) + a(p∗∗2 )] = 0.
11Note that heterogeneity is more likely to be relevant in the captive segment than in the competitive
segment because in the competitive segment consumers can choose among alternative offerings so that they
are more likely to be satisfied with one of them than in a monopoly situation.
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(p∗2 − l − fLC2 ) + [s2(p∗1, p∗2) + a(p∗∗2 )] = 0.








(p∗2 − l − fLC2 ) + [a(p∗2 +∆l)− a(p∗2)] = 0.
Generically this equation is violated.12 Q.E.D.
Clearly, it would be desirable to know in which way the equilibrium outcome changes.
To answer this question in more detail, it is useful to consider for a moment the case that
the non-integrated network could price discriminate between the two segments. In the non-
captive market segment, the analysis of section 2 applies. Hence, prices have the same
price levels as prices derived in the previous section; we denote these prices as pC∗1 and p
C∗
2 .
In its captive market segment, the non-integrated network then would solve the following
maximization problem maxp2 a(p2)(p2− l−fLC2 ). Hence, it would set the monopoly price pM2
in this segment which satisfies a0(pM2 )(p
M






pM2 − l − fLC2
pM2
.
This is the well-known inverse elasticity rule. Suppose the price elasticity of demand in the
captive segment is a constant ε with |ε| > 1 (derived from a(p2) = kpε2). The inverse elasticity





(l + fLC2 )
Changes in the lease price by ∆l translate into an increase of the price charged to the captive
consumers by (1− (1/|ε|))∆l. Hence, the price pM2 increases always by more than ∆l (since
|ε| > 1).13 In the limit as |ε| goes to 1, we have lim|ε|→1(1 − (1/|ε|)) = ∞ and the smaller
the demand elasticity the more sensitive reacts the price to a lease price increase.
The monopoly price in segment 2, pM2 , may be higher or lower than the equilibrium price
in segment 1. To fix ideas we call the former situation a high-value situation because overall
there is a sufficient number of consumers attaching high value to the product of firm 2, (i.e.
12For instance, if a is linear the lease price is never neutral.
13This holds more generally since demand at the profit-maximizing price is always elastic, i.e. |ε| > 1.
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consumers with a willingness-to-pay above pC∗2 ) so that the non-integrated network optimally
sets its price above pC∗2 . We call the latter situation a low-value situation because overall
there is an insufficient number of consumers attaching high value to the product of firm 2,
so that the network optimally sets its price below pC∗2 . An alternative interpretation would
be to look at the (imperfectly) competitive segment. Then the former situation can be called
a competitive situation because competition in segment 1 is sufficiently strong to lead to
an equilibrium price below the monopoly price in the captive segment. Similarly, the latter
situation can be called an uncompetitive situation. In any case the captive segment is added
value for the non-integrated network (and for the integrated network, provided the lease price
is above costs).
In our setup in which the non-integrated network cannot price-discriminate between seg-
ments the qualitative results for the equilibrium prices depend on whether we are in a high-
value or a low-value situation. From the definition of a high-value situation it follows that
the profit maximizing price p2 given p∗1 is between the equilibrium price in the competitive
segment pC∗2 and the monopoly price in the captive segment p
M
2 . Hence, in a high-value sit-
uation if networks offer strategic complements, equilibrium prices in our non-discrimination
setup are higher than equilibrium prices in the competitive segment in the setup with price
discrimination.14 This implies that in a high-value situation the integrated network neces-
sarily benefits from the existence of a captive segment because its profits in the competitive
segment are higher than without the captive segment. The reason is that firm 1 can increase
p∗1. In addition, it makes revenues from selling wholesale-access to consumers in the captive
segment of the non-integrated network. In a low-value situation equilibrium prices in our
non-discrimination setup are lower than equilibrium prices in the competitive segment in the
setup with price discrimination.
How does the lease price affect equilibrium outcomes? First note that the qualitative
result that a lease price increase leads to higher retail prices is robust to the introduction of
partial participation. Formally, the result is shown by the fact that the best-response of both
firms is shifted outward by a lease price increase, i.e. ∂2πi/∂pi∂l > 0, provided that networks
offer strategic complements.
14Note that in standard models of price competition with differentiated products, firms offer strategic
complements (see e.g. Vives, 1990, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; for an application of the theory to
telecommunications markets see Peitz, 2003). Consequently, best responses ri are upward sloping. Comparing
partial to full participation is a comparative statics exercise. Introducing a captive segment makes the best-




We also address the question whether the retail price increase is more pronounced under
partial than under full participation. Suppose that initially we are in a low-value situation,
that is, pM2 is less than the competitive price under discrimination p
C∗
2 . Then, as argued
above the equilibrium price must be p∗2 < p
C∗
2 . Consider now an increase in the lease price.
With the (constant) elasticity ε greater than 1, the price in the captive segment pM2 increases
by more than ∆l. As shown in section 3, the price in the competitive segment increases
exactly by ∆l. Hence, it is possible that we move from a low-value situation to a high-value
situation. In other words, if the elasticity is sufficiently low (but greater than 1), then a lease
price increase leads to a regime shift from a low-value situation to a high-value situation.
Hence, the presence of a captive segment amplifies the retail price increase. Starting from an
initial situation in which prices are below the competitive price under discrimination, after a
lease price increase they will be set above the corresponding prices if demand is sufficiently
inelastic.
Result 4. Suppose that the initial situation is a low-value situation. Then a retail price
increase following from a lease price increase is greater with partial participation than with
full participation, given that the demand in the captive segment is not too elastic.
Clearly if the initial situation is a high value situation, the final situation after a lease
price increase will also be a high-value situation. Similarly for a lease price reduction: either
we move from a high-value situation to a low-value situation or we remain in a low-value
situation.
Note that the level of the lease price is not welfare-neutral as it was in the case of full
participation. A higher lease price translates into higher retail prices. This does not affect
consumer participation in the competitive segment but it reduces consumer participation in
the competitive segment. The mark-up charged by firm 2 leads to a deadweight loss. From a
social point of view any retail price above the social costs fLL1 + f
LC
2 is detrimental to social
welfare. Since firms have market power, firm 2 charges a mark-up over its perceived marginal
costs l + fLC2 . Hence, if the optimal regulation in a market in which firm 2 does not have
market power (e.g. because it forms a competitive fringe together with other firms) implies
that the lease price should be equal to costs, the optimal regulation in a market in which firm
2 does have market power is to set the lease price below costs. With respect to welfare in
the captive segment and ignoring other welfare effects, optimal lease price regulation would
have the property that the lease price is below costs and the resulting equilibrium price of
firm 2 given this lease price is equal to costs fLL1 + f
LC
2 . Are there additional welfare effects
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which have to be considered? There is no welfare loss due to higher prices in the competitive
segment due to inelastic demand. Hence, the lower lease price would be neutral to market
share if firm 2 could price discriminate. However, without discrimination best responses
are no longer symmetric. Also, a change in the lease price affects the firms’ best-response
functions differently. It depends on the exact change to determine whether firm 1 or firm 2
gains market share in the competitive segment after a change in lease price.
We can summarize the discussion up to this point by the following statement.
Result 5. Suppose that the welfare effects of the captive segment dominate welfare effects in
the competitive segment if they go in different directions. A regulator who only controls the
lease price optimally sets its lease price below costs to control for the market power of firm 2.
We can elaborate on this by considering a lease price increase that leads from a low-
value to a high-value situation. For this consider the special case that the slope of firm 1’s
best response is globally greater than 1 (note that this is a natural assumption to make
in the present context). If this is the case then in equilibrium with the initial lease price
the equilibrium lies below the 45-degree line in the price-space (p1, p2), that is, p1 > p2
in equilibrium and consequently s1 < s2. In a high-value situation the reverse holds and
consequently s1 > s2. From a social point of view, the optimal market share is 1/2 in the
competitive segment (provided that the market is symmetric). Then a low lease price tends
to lead to a socially excessive market share of the non-integrated network whereas a high
lease price tends to lead to a socially excessive market share of the integrated network.
Laffont and Tirole (1994) consider a similar market environment in which also firm 2
enjoys market power. They are interested in the structure of Ramsey prices, that is the
welfare-maximizing access and retail prices under the constraint that firms do not make
losses. They show that the Ramsey pricing formulas in a market in which firm 2 does not
have market power has to be modified. Since the retail price of firm 2 tends to be too high,
the access price should reflect this type of inefficiency and therefore has to be set lower.
Finally, we would like to comment on investment and entry incentives. Clearly, if there
are sunk costs to enter the industry, the regulator may have to guarantee a positive level
of operating profits to the entrant. Clearly, ignoring strategic interaction in the competitive
segment, a lower lease price leads to a higher profit of firm 2 in the captive segment because
it can serve those consumers at a lower cost. In this sense a lower lease price stimulates entry.
At the same time, a lower lease price tends to lead to lower retail prices overall since it makes
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firm 2 less interested in high prices in the captive segment. This indirect effect then leads to
a lower profit of firm 2.
Also, we can consider firm 1’s incentive to invest in quality, where firm 1 takes into
account the dependence of lease price on quality. Here result 2, which is shown under full
participation, appears to be robust to the addition of a captive segment for the non-integrated
firm.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we extended existing insights on unbundling of the local loop in telecommu-
nications markets to a more general setting. The extensions were in two dimensions: first,
partial consumer participation, and second (more generally), imperfect competition. In par-
ticular, we looked at the effects of increases of the lease price of the local loop on retail prices.
In addition, we derived implications related to the network operator’s incentives to invest in
quality or capacity of local connections to end-users. The kind of insights that we obtained
can be useful for policy makers and regulators, as our paper complements discussions on
efficiency-based approaches (focusing on efficient use of existing networks) and cost-based
approaches (focusing of efficient investment in new networks) to regulation of LLU.15
Although the analysis was framed in a telecommunications setting, the results have a more
general applicability, extending to other markets as well. Further research should identify
exactly when and to what extent this type of results apply to other sectors. For example, in
sectors such as post and electricity it makes sense to model the particular characteristics of
these markets, which may lead to more detailed results.
We believe that the analysis of one-way access situations that lead to imperfect competi-
tion in the retail market, such as in the model that we explored, needs further consideration.
Our results, which focused on the effects of the access price on retail competition, provide
some flavor of a broader research program. In future work we plan, for instance, to consider
VoIP in more depth. As remarked in the introduction, an interesting feature of broadband
internet access is that it allows for competition in voice telephony through VoIP. Whereas
VoIP is sometimes implemented as a peer-to-peer application on end-users’ computers (e.g.
Skype), there exist also providers of VoIP that use ‘gateways’ to interconnect to the PSTN,
that is, the public telephony network (an example of such a provider is Vonage in the US). The
latter type of VoIP allows its users to connect to all (including ‘traditional’) telephony cus-
15See Gual and Seabright (2000) for a discussion of these approaches.
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tomers. Because of their different business model, such providers may provide very different
pricing structures than those offered by former incumbents, which moreover face regulatory
constraints on their pricing strategies. Thus, it may happen that a VoIP provider, offering a
flat-rate scheme, competes with a telecommunications operator offering a two-part tariff.
A more general question related to the discussion above, which features prominently
in current policy discussions, is whether a new technology, that allows entrants to make
innovative use of unbundling agreements, should be regulated or not. With regard to VoIP in
particular, an important question is whether a provider of VoIP services should be put under
the regulatory umbrella or not.16 Accordingly, it may be interesting to introduce asymmetric
constraints on possible strategies, in particular with respect to retail pricing and quality
requirements, that can be chosen by the integrated and non-integrated firm, and analyze how
welfare is affected.
16 In the US, for instance, the Internet Policy Working Group of the Federal Communications Commission
tries to identify the policy issues that arise as telecommunications moves to internet-based platforms.
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